Abstract
I shall argue that David Benatar’s Axiological Asymmetry of harms and benefits, when combined with (exclusively) hedonistic view of harms and benefits, entail pro-mortalism. Professor Benatar’s view that the absence of pleasure of who never exists does not deprive, while the absence of pleasure of who ceased to exist does deprive, has some absurd conclusions that judges which life is preferable one differently in present- and future-life cases. I subsequently show that Benatar’s asymmetry should be applied to post-mortem nonexistence as well, and argue so long as one’s remaining life will contain any pain, it is always preferable to cease to exist than to continue to exist.
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