Abstract
It is generally recognized that principals and agents both have an incentive to minimize shirking, and that this is often accomplished by entering into long term relationships in which the agent is offered rewards that increase with seniority. This paper considers that the congressional seniority system may exist as a means of insuring that representatives (agents) are faithful to the demands of constituents (principals). The unique feature of the seniority system, that tenure is rewarded with increasing power rather than increasing pay, is explained as a consequence of the need for each group to make credible commitments to the other. Rules changes adopted by the House of Representatives in the mid 1970s are used to test the impact of alternative rules on election outcomes.
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