Why is it so hard to provide a faithful representation? The impact of indirectly evoked incentives on the accounting policy decision and the accountant’s subsequent post-decision distortion

Abstract

PurposeThe study aims to investigate the impact of indirectly evoked incentives, in the form of supervisor’s preferences, on the decision about accounting policy regarding depreciation method selection and to examine subsequent post-decision distortion by evaluating the depreciation method.Design/methodology/approachThe authors conducted two experiments with control and treatment groups, manipulating the supervisor’s indirectly evoked preferences. In Study 2, the authors also measured the evaluation of both depreciation methods to investigate post-decisional distortion regarding the assessment of the depreciation method chosen in a decision task. Study 1 was conducted among 85 accounting students, while Study 2 consisted of 200 accountants.FindingsBoth studies revealed the significant impact of supervisor’s indirectly evoked preferences on accounting policy decisions. Participants who were aware of supervisors’ preferences were more likely to choose the depreciation method that was consistent with those preferences. The authors also found that those participants attached a higher value to the depreciation method, providing evidence that adherence to the supervisor’s preferences results in a distorted assessment of the depreciation methods.Originality/valueFirst, this study shows that indirectly evoked supervisors’ preferences may lead to a departure from substantive criteria resulting in low-quality accounting outcomes. Second, the assessment of the depreciation method is inseparable from the situational context, as the evaluation of the depreciation method is interdependent upon the preferences of the choice of a depreciation method and the fulfillment of those preferences.