Why Freedom Implies Equality

Abstract

Equality and freedom have been represented as conflicting values. In this paper, I propose to argue that the idea of freedom has clear egalitarian implications. Freedom is commonly represented as being negative or positive, but it has both senses in ordinary usage, and the distinction fails adequately to explain the relationship between views on freedom and poverty. An alternative representation of the concept distinguishes individual freedom, based on the autonomous individual, from social freedom, which sees freedom as a social relationship. Equality implies the elimination of disadvantage. Freedom is a redistributive idea, implying that the freedom of some must be restricted to increase the freedom of others. Although the individual concept of freedom is restrictive, equal treatment and equality of opportunity are largely compatible with it, and even equality of outcome can be reconciled with it to some degree. The social concept of freedom is broader, extending the scope of redistribution to all forms of social disadvantage. This demands a high degree of equality; it also defines the boundaries of the pursuit of equality, which is justifiable in so far as it increases freedom. Freedom is not, therefore, in conflict with equality. Certain egalitarian assumptions are part of its normative base, and it actively requires a degree of redistribution. The pursuit of equality has been presented as conflicting with the freedom of the individual in two main ways. First, it is said to change the relation of the individual to the state In order to achieve equality, it is necessary for the state to intervene in people's lives, both to redress existing disadvantage and to prevent further inequalities from arising. Liberal thinkers have held that there is a province of individual action, and of relationships in small groups, in which the state has no concern, and any intrusion into this province is an invasion of individual liberty. Secondly, egalitarianism implies some form of redistribution, the removal of the advantages of one person in order to remedy the disadvantages of another. Raphael writes that, the legal requirement to give up a proportion of one's income to the State means that one is not free to do as one likes with the money. (1) He is quite content to accept this conflict; freedom is, after all, only one possible moral value of several, and redistribution of this kind is fundamental to the provision of basic welfare services. Others, like Hayek (2), are less sanguine: a state which assumes collective responsibilities cannot avoid requiring citizens to undertake certain duties towards it, duties which may constitute an unacceptable infringement of personal liberty.