Abstract
ABSTRACTThis article builds on work by Devine and Kopko (2021) and Lacy and Burden (1999) who estimated a probit model of candidate choice from nationally representative survey data to determine the second choice of third-party voters. Using this model on 2020 election data, we show that the Libertarian candidate Jo Jorgenson probably cost Donald Trump victory in at least two states: Arizona and Georgia. Additionally, the popular-vote margin enjoyed by Joe Biden could have been between 260,000 and 525,000 fewer votes, using conservative estimates. The motivation for this article is to provide contrary evidence for two main misconceptions. First, that third-party candidates are “spoiling” elections for the Democrats. Our evidence clearly shows that third parties have the potential to hurt either of the two main parties; however, in 2020, it was Donald Trump who was hurt the most, although not consequentially. Second, some reformers believe that ranked-choice voting benefits the Democrats; again, we show that—all else being equal—in the 2020 presidential election, it was the Republicans who would have benefited by the change in rules because the majority of third-party votes went to the Libertarian candidate, whose voters prefer Republicans over Democrats 60% to 32%.
Highlights
R eforms to address perceived deficiencies in American elections have included changes to primary rules (Grose 2020; McGhee et al 2014), redistricting reform (Grofman and Cervas 2018; Nagle 2019; Saxon 2020), and revisions to election registration and balloting rules (Burden et al 2014), among others (Wang et al 2021)
An unsuccessful lawsuit in Maine brought by members of the Republican Party asked the court to find ranked-choice voting (RCV) unconstitutional (United States District Court District of Maine 2018)
The bottom line is simple: a priori, there is no reason to believe that RCV has any partisan or ideological bias, even if it congressional district
Summary
Even if minor-party candidates did not change the presidential election outcome in 2016 (Devine and Kopko 2016, 2021), can we state the same for 2020? After reviewing work on the effects of minor-party candidates in 2016 and examining the probable effects of minority-party candidacies in 2020 under current election rules, we consider what might have happened in 2020 had presidential voting taken place under RCV.
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