Abstract
I bet you don’t practice your philosophical intuitions. What’s your excuse? If you think philosophical training improves the reliability of philosophical intuitions, then practicing intuitions should improve them even further. I argue that philosophers’ reluctance to practice their intuitions highlights a tension in the way that they think about the role of intuitions in philosophy.
Highlights
Do philosophers have more reliable intuitions than novices about philosophical matters? Do philosophers have expert intuitions? The idea that they do, or that they may be assumed to, has recently been entertained by a number of philosophers for a number of reasons
One area in which there has been much discussion of this idea is in debate about a so-called expertise defense of the use of intuitions in philosophy
It is instructive to give a quick overview of one aspect of the debate about the expertise defense
Summary
Do philosophers have more reliable intuitions than novices about philosophical matters? Do philosophers have expert intuitions? The idea that they do, or that they may be assumed to, has recently been entertained by a number of philosophers for a number of reasons. One might say that philosophers should be expected to have more reliable intuitions than novices because they have had a greater chance to practice having intuitions about hypothetical cases and so on.
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