Why Do Governments Delegate Authority to Quasi-Autonomous Agencies? The Case of Independent Administrative Authorities in France

Abstract

In recent years, there has been a considerable degree of delegation from governments to quasi-autonomous agencies. Various reasons have been put forward to explain why governments decide to delegate authority in this way. Some reasons are based on a transaction-cost approach, such as credible commitments. Other reasons are more contextual. For instance, governments may be responding to a process of cross-national policy transfer. In the literature on delegation some hypotheses have already been tested. Specifically, evidence has been found suggesting that governments create agencies to commit credibly to particular policy choices. However, other hypotheses, particularly ones based on contextual explanations, have proved much more difficult to operationalize. This article aims to help fill this gap. It does so by focusing on the creation of Independent Administrative Authorities in France. Does the qualitative evidence in this particular case corroborate the quantitative studies that have been undertaken elsewhere?