Why do Countries Knowingly Sign Ineffective Treaties? The Case of High Seas Fishing

Abstract

States Parties signing and ratifying the 1982 fishing Convention and 1995 Agreement did so knowing they would be ineffective in the stated aim of efficiently managing high seas straddling and highly migratory fish stocks. It is argued that both coastal states and distant water fishing nations signed on because they gained international recognition of their 200-mile exclusive economic zones but that coastal states looked forward to concessions by distant water fishing nations on the management of straddling stocks. These concessions could include compulsory arbitration of disputes; allow prosecutions of illegal activity of foreign fishing boats in coastal state courts; withdraw shipmasters licenses if found to be overfishing; and to encourage better surveillance by costal states by requiring any fines levied by a foreign court to be transferred to the coastal state offended against. Improved collaboration between countries, better surveillance, and increased sanctions are all needed.