Abstract

Abstract This work presents two implementation attacks against cryptographic algorithms. Based on these two presented attacks, this thesis shows that the assessment of physical attack complexity is error-prone. Hence, cryptography should not rely on it. Cryptographic technologies have to be protected against all implementation attacks, have they already been realized or not. The development of countermeasures does not require the successful execution of an attack but can already be carried out as soon as the principle of a side channel or a fault attack is understood.

Highlights

  • Cryptanalysis is the art and science of revealing secret information of cryptographic systems

  • Based on this low-cost setup, we developed the theory of Simple Photonic Emission Analysis (SPEA) and Differential Photonic Emission Analysis (DPEA) and conducted practical attacks

  • We explained the theory of Simple Photonic Emission Analysis and Differential Photonic Emission Analysis and showed successful photonic side channel attacks against Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) based on a low-cost measurement setup

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Summary

Introduction

Cryptanalysis is the art and science of revealing secret information of cryptographic systems. The resistance against physical attacks is an important consideration These do not target the underlying mathematical principles, but the implementation of the cipher. The first group measures physical characteristics of the device performing the attacked cryptographic operations, without modifying the computation These attacks are called passive attacks or side channel attacks. The underlying principle of side channel attacks was known long before 1996, at least to secret services: in 1952, a covert listening device was found in the Moscow embassy of the United States. It was a replica of the Great Seal of the United States, presented from Soviet youths to the U.S ambassador in Moscow already in 1946. Does sensitive information have to be secured with mathematically secure algorithms, but the concrete implementations of these algorithms have to withstand physical attacks

Thesis Statement
Thesis Contributions
Structure of the Thesis
Chapter 2 Mathematical and Cryptological Background
Elliptic Curves
Bilinear Pairings
Cryptographic Algorithms and Protocols
The Advanced Encryption Standard
Identity-Based Cryptography from Pairings
Side Channel Attacks
Timing Attacks
Power Analysis
Electromagnetic Analysis
Other Side Channels
Fault Attacks
Elliptic Curve Cryptography
Symmetric Cryptography
Photonic Emission
Photonic Emission in CMOS
Detection of Photonic Emission
Applications of Photonic Emission
Experimental Setups
The Target Devices
Emission Images
Spatial and Temporal Analysis
Chapter 4 The Photonic Side Channel
Simple Photonic Emission Analysis
Physical Attack
Cryptanalysis
Countermeasures
Differential Photonic Emission Analysis
Experimental Setup
Low-Cost Glitching Platform
Instruction Skips
Realization of Higher-Order Fault Attacks
Second-Order Fault Attack against the Eta Pairing
Modification of n in the Eta Pairing
Algebraic Model of the Secret
Computation of Candidates
Testing Candidates
Modification of f in the Eta Pairing
Modification of f in the Reduced Tate Pairing
Future Work
The Photonic Side Channel
Fault Attacks against Pairing-Based Cryptography
Conclusion
Findings
Advice for Cryptographers
Full Text
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