Why Can't We Supervise What Central Banks are Doing in Our Name? Troubling Gaps in State Auditing of Central Banks in Eurozone

Abstract

Article presents the attempts of Central banks in Europe to avoid comprehensive supervision over the regularity and performance of their operations by referring to their independence. Even though the effectiveness of operations of central banks in Europe significant influences public finance standings and economic situation in general, there is no efficient control established over the central banks in Europe. National central banks (NCB) in Eurozone are reluctant to account to Supreme Audit Institutions (SAI) since they endeavour to achieve the legal prohibition of audit of their operations respectively they are willing to agree only to significantly limited audit scope of (less important) parts of their operations. The final decisions are in hands of national parliaments that are – without prejudice to the competence of the EU institutions – independent in determining the scope of audit by the national SAIs over the national central banks.