Why Boycott of the Elections is a Bad Idea?

Abstract

By studying the game theory, we find that many games are related to each other and leave mutual effect on each other. In addition, we find that the Nash equilibrium does not exist in some games or, if there is in one, does not describe a real event. Here we show that the matching pennies game with pure strategy has the solution, but this solution is a game that happens simultaneously with this game. Using this solution, we will answer the Brookings Institution's question of boycotting the election whether the opposition's boycott of elections is, in different circumstances, a defeated strategy. A strategy that its result in most cases is failure and the least possible consequence by the opposition. In response to the Brookings Institution's question, one of the major issues facing political science theorists is whether the realization of democracy requires a consensus and a public agreement on the public sphere. So far, various answers have been given to this question. In this article, we will focus on the two key concepts of agonism and antagonism, while briefly reviewing the answers.