Why be moral? A reply to Donahue and Tierno

Abstract

Thomas J. Donahue and Joel Tiernol seek to provide a formal, normative answer to the question, Why be moral? Their argument proceeds by identifying an inconsistent triad of beliefs typically held by the amoralist: I am entitled to moral consideration from others; I do not differ from others in the possession of some special characteristic entitling the possessor to moral consideration; I have no obligation to extend moral consideration to others. In the following, I seek to describe a rational amoralist, with a commitment to avoiding contradictions in her beliefs, who is not guilty of the inconsistency identified by Donahue and Tierno. My amoralist holds the second and third beliefs, but not the first. She appears to hold the first through a variety of apparent speech acts deliberately executed for effect, but such is a mistaken ascription. This amoralist has noticed that some linguistic behavior generally secures desirable linguistic and non-linguistic behavior on the part of others. As these desirable behaviors often serve her interests, she goes to some pains to encourage those behaviors, and so engages in the requisite linguistic behavior that elicits those interest-serving responses. She calls her own linguistic behaviors, "making moral claims." While expressions such as, "1 deserve moral consideration," and, "1 deserve respect," occur in her linguistic behavior, these have no more cognitive content for her than does clearing her throat or tapping on a glass with a spoon to gain the attention of others. That is, she regards this range of linguistic behavior to be simply behavior which produces an effect; she has no beliefs of the form "that-p" where p is a place marker for instances of any of the set of elements of her linguistic behavior called "making moral claims."