Why Are There Two Versions of Meno’s Paradox?

Abstract

AbstractThis article seeks to answer why there are two different versions of Meno’s Paradox. I argue that the dilemma contained in Socrates’ version is a pre‐existing puzzle, familiar to both Meno and Socrates before their discussion. The two versions of the paradox are thus different because Meno’s version is a mistaken attempt to remember the puzzle contained in Socrates’ version. Although Meno’s version is a mistaken attempt to state Socrates’ version, it is a philosophically richer puzzle that makes three interesting points about inquiry and recognition. After arguing that Socrates’ version is unsound and that Meno’s version is an attempt to recollect or remember Socrates’ version, I analyze Meno’s version in detail. In closing, I consider the relationship between the notion of recognition, which figures prominently in Meno’s version, and the theory of recollection, suggesting that the latter may have arisen as an attempt to explain the origin of moral intuitions.