Abstract
This paper investigates the private-interest and public-interest theories of regulatory change to analyse the politico-economic determinants of securities transaction taxation (STT), a fiscal tool that has been practised in most industrialised countries. Combining contrasting predictions from the two theories with political arguments used and a number of recorded economic facts from Swedish STT history during the entire twentieth century, I find that the interest-group factors related to the relative strength of taxed and subsidised groups best explain the timing of STT changes. By contrast, the distortive and fiscally insignificant STT, and the other historical evidence, reject most arguments used to justify the government tax policy in a public-interest view.
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