Why Appoint a Weak Mediator? A Strategic Choice to Reduce Uncertainty in International Mediation

Abstract

Abstract Existing research on mediation finds that mediation by a strong mediator is both more prevalent and more conducive to a negotiated settlement. However, why disputants select a weak mediator remains unclear. From the perspective of the uncertainty mechanism, the nature of mediation is a procedure for sharing private information and reducing disputants’ uncertainty regarding the resolve to continue fighting. Disputants can benefit from mediation through gaining a comparative advantage regarding uncertainty by focusing on either controlling the sharing of their own information or increasing their opponents’ sharing of information. With regard to these two strategic choices, this article argues that the selection of a weak mediator is more likely when disputants prefer controlling the sharing of their information to expanding their opponents’ information sharing. Correspondingly, three potential factors that influence the disputants’ strategic choice of gaining a comparative advantage regarding uncertainty are applied, namely, a previous mediation in the dispute; the dispute’s level of hostility; and the power disparity between the disputants. The author compiles data from the International Crisis Behaviour (ICB, 1918–2015) data set and the International Conflict Management (ICM, 1945–2003) data set for the empirical analysis. The results show that mediation by a weak mediator is more likely when it is the first time that the disputants have submitted to mediation in the dispute and when the dispute’s level of hostility is low. In some cases, a large power disparity between the disputants also makes the selection of a weak mediator more likely.