Why a Uniform Basic Income Offends Justice

Julia Maskivker

doi:10.23941/ejpe.v11i2.335

Abstract

This article explains why the traditional defense of the Basic Income policy is flawed in its assumptions about allocative uniformity. The paper argues that treating everybody identically by way of a uniform grant is ultimately in tension with the egalitarian rationale behind the Basic Income. Phillipe Van Parijs, the champion defender of the policy proposal, has fervently argued that unconditional receipt of a universal grant will render society more just by way of the egalitarian distribution of “real freedom” that the policy would elicit. Although Van Parijs is right in supposing that Basic Income will enhance real freedom, his theoretical apparatus is not prepared to address questions of differences in the level of opportunity already enjoyed by the beneficiaries of the policy. This failure poses a problem for normative reasoning, namely, that morally relevant differences among individuals are ignored. This paper concentrates on the implications of this blindness and provides an equality metric that is better equipped to recognize disparity and its moral implications.

Highlights

This article explains why the traditional defense of the basic income policy is flawed in its assumptions about uniform allocations
Such considerations suggest that basic income is more than academic conjecture: its growing presence in policy discussions around the globe indicates that it is a proposal with great opportunity
My analysis is limited to claiming that, because some individuals already enjoy a relatively high level of real freedom before the basic income is implemented, it would be a waste of resources and morally unjustified to include them as natural beneficiaries of the policy

Summary

BASIC INCOME AND DIFFERENCE

The basic income proposal has gained much traction during the last five years as a possible mechanism to fight poverty in advanced economies which are plagued by recession. Philippe Van Parijs, the champion defender of basic income, has consistently argued that unconditional receipt of a uniform grant will render society more just by way of the egalitarian distribution of real freedom that the policy would elicit. As logically valid as the existing arguments for a basic income are, it remains true that the notion of identical dispensation (uniformity) would seem to entail the assumption that, in the absence of a basic income at all, everybody’s real freedom is affected in a way that we should lament This is obviously not the case as people’s effective capacity to do things in life (and pay for them) varies according to family situation, personal background, inherited advantage, and other variables beyond their control.

UNIFORMITY AND JUSTICE

AGENCY AND UNIVERSALITY OF THE GRANT

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

CONCLUSION