Abstract
ABSTRACT This paper addresses a current confusion in debates on the morality of experimentation on human pre-embryos: the confusion that arises from ambiguity in the sense of ‘human being’. We may quite legitimately decide to apply the term ‘human being’to all entities with human DNA but in that case we should not then imply that all human beings are as much objects of moral concern as the fetus or a post-parturate human being. It is argued that whatever classifying terms we use, potential entities need to be distinguished from actual entities and that the very notion of potentiality rests on this distinction. The paper does not offer an argument in favour of experimentation, rather it appeals for clear thought. Moral attitudes to experimentation on pre-embryos are varied and attempts to analyse issues through implicit appeal to emotionally ambiguous terms do not help the moral debate.
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