Abstract
Firms engage in corporate political activity in an attempt to have a voice in the policy conversation. In recent years, CEOs have also increasingly become involved in corporate political activity. This paper investigates how CEO general ability affects the breadth of a company’s lobbying efforts, and how this relationship is moderated by the company’s performance feedback. Our findings indicate that CEO general ability is related to the breadth of lobbying efforts of a company in a curvilinear relationship, and that the gap between the company’s performance aspirations and actual performance moderates this relationship. These results have important implications for understanding the role of CEO ability in shaping corporate political activity.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
