WHO MAKES U.S. TRADE POLICY?

Abstract

The foreign policy literature typically sees Congress abdicating its policy making role to the executive, implying a presidential dominance model is superior to other policy process models (joint participation, congressional dominance, and bureaucratic dominance). This article uses two theoretical approaches to investigate who actually makes U.S. trade policy: a political economy approach and an institutional approach. We look at the 1985 96 period and at individual presidencies: Reagan (1985-88), Bush (1989-92), and Clinton (1993-96). Contrary to the literature, we find strong evidence that Congress is an active participant in the trade policy making process. Using a variety of empirical techniques (crosstabs, the Index of Revealed Comparative Advantage, pairwise correlations, and stepwise logistic regressions), we confirm that the trade policy process for product-industry-specific policies tends to be dominated by Congress whereas the executive branch is more influential in the policy process for country-specific policies. We conclude by noting the advantage of integrating aspects of both the political economy of trade and institu tional literatures to understand the nuances of U.S. foreign trade policy making.