Abstract
AbstractWith regard to the sociality of agency and the role that second‐person address plays, I propose to contrast and develop (1) a Fichtean‐Darwallian account that seems to tie agency to mutual recognition but tacitly presupposes a more fundamental agency independent of it that enables us to enter the circle of recognition. (2) A Brandomian account that although initially proposing a more robustly social account of agency, ultimately remains entrapped in a game of mirrors. (3) Hegel's own approach recasts the issue by giving up the idea that the sociality of agency can be understood in terms of what I call a game of recognitional tag. Instead, we are inhabiting a practice that involves a social struggle about the very form of this practice, and it is this that Hegel has termed a “struggle for recognition.”
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
