Who gets ahead in authoritarian parliaments? The case of the Russian state duma

Abstract

ABSTRACT Scholarly attention to authoritarian legislatures is steadily growing, and recent research suggests that there is substantial lawmaking activity and deliberation within these bodies. Does such activity matter for legislators themselves? Can it improve their career prospects? I examine the career paths of Russian national legislators, using a newly collected data set on biographies and parliamentary performance of politicians who served in the Russian State Duma in 2004–2016. I find that members who apply more effort in legislative work are more likely to keep their parliamentary seats, but legislative effort does not increase the probability of executive appointment. Rather, legislators appear to be recruited into executive offices on the basis of previous work experience or personal ties. Parliamentary service, however, may still help legislators get ahead by making them more visible to government leadership. My research highlights that legislatures may be used by authoritarian governments to improve the management of political careers.