Who fought the Japanese in Hunan? Some Views of China's War Effort

Abstract

A MONG the many areas of disagreement that separate American and Nationalist interpretations of the Second World War, perhaps none angers the as much as the American charge that Chiang Kai-shek and his forces did not actively resist the Japanese after the United States entered the war. The issue is, of course, an emotional one for the Chinese, but the question seems clearly to be of the kind that may be answered by examining the facts. Does the evidence indicate that Government troops did conserve their strength to meet the Communists after Japan's defeat-or did they continue to fight throughout the war? This note, based on limited research, cannot resolve the controversy but should indicate the need for further study of Japanese and sources, as they become available. In I962, the Department of State released its Foreign Relations of the United States, I943, China.' For a variety of reasons, this volume had been withheld from the public for five years since printing-and one of these reasons may well have been the fact that it included statements on China's war effort which would certainly irritate the Taipei audience. There was nothing new in the charges that Chiang was reluctant to commit his troops to battle after I942. General Stilwell had made his views clear; the White Paper on China had contained numerous allusions to apathy; scholars like Herbert Feis had accepted the contention that the Chinese were doing too little of what they could do for themselves and based his interpretation of the war-time frictions and frustrations on this point.2 What was new in this I943 volume of the Foreign Relations series, was evidence that Clarence Gauss, the American Ambassador to China, was criticizing China's war effort at a time when President Roosevelt had to make decisions vital to China's future-at Cairo and at Teheran-and at a time when the Government was trying desperately to obtain a loan from the United States. To the Nationalists, these decisions, like those made subsequently at Yalta, were in large part responsible for their ultimate exile on Taiwan. Gauss's contentions were then, of especial significance, for to refute them was to help place the blame for the Nationalist failure upon the United States. On October i8, I943, Gauss reported to Hull that the Government was