Who Determines the Self in the Politics of Self-Determination? Identity and Preference Formation in Tatarstan's Nationalist Mobilization

Abstract

In the late 1980s, as the world's oldest socialist state launched a massive program of economic and political reform, nationalism in the Soviet republics contributed not only to the end of reform, but also to the unexpected collapse of the Soviet Union itself. By 1991 fifteen new nation-states were created out of the union republics. National independence for these states represented the crowning moment in ethnonationalist revivals initiated by intellectuals but carried out by mass publics through protest cycles, popular referenda, and, ultimately, elections for independence. At the same time, national revival had also been taking place within the Soviet Union's autonomous republics, the majority of which were located inside Russia.'1 In the Tatar Autonomous Republic nationalist politics was developing along a trajectory similar to that of the most aggressive union republics. In 1988 the nationalist Tatar Public Center (TOTs) was formed, explicitly modeling itself on the Baltic popular front organizations. It began by calling for the protection of Tatar culture and ended up championing full independence for Tatarstan. In 1991 a radical wing broke off from TOTs and formed Ittifak, or Alliance. Ittifak promoted an exclusivist nationalist agenda, openly hostile to Russians in Tatarstan. As Ittifak attempted to win support away from the moderate Tatars, pro-Russian and profederalist groups organized in response. In the radicalization of the Tatar nationalist movement and in the growing popular support for these groups, we observe the origins of an ethnic outbidding scenario. Ethnic outbidding takes place when political entrepreneurs in a multiethnic polity attract political support by advocating a more ethnically exclusivist program than other politicians. In Tatarstan, despite early mobilization, neither outbidding nor mass nationalist mobilization ultimately occurred. Unlike the union republics, the autonomous republics remained a part of the Russian Federation. Popular support for the nationalists in Tatarstan weakened as the more moderate President Shamiev and his government emerged as the political victor. With the conclusion of a bilateral treaty between Tatarstan and Moscow in 1994, the republic backed away from national secession. By 1996 nationalist opposition groups had become practically irrelevant. How can the rise and subsequent wane of nationalist mobilization in Tatarstan be understood? And what can attention to cases of unsuccessful ethnic mobilization illustrate about the phenomenon more generally?