Abstract

In light of additional information market agents would achieve better outcomes, for example, a lower ask price for the buyer and a higher offer price for the seller. I examine this notion in a labor market, where employers and employees do not possess perfect information about wages, and address the question of who benefits from the information provided by job placement services? The empirical strategy considers the two-sided nature of the labor market. Estimates of employee and employer incomplete information are contrasted between users and non-users of placement services provided by Job Corps, America’s largest and most important job training program for youths. Findings suggest that employees that use placement services don’t have more information about better offer wages, relative to non-users. Interestingly, firms that employed users of placement services are better informed about reservation wages relative to firms that employed non-users.

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