Whistleblower Protection in developing countries: A review of Challenges and Prospects

Abstract

Generally, public bureaucracies are typically ill-disposed to promote whistleblowing and whistleblower protection. In developing countries, however, this takes an additional challenge. Public administration in these contexts operates in a largely clientelistic political marketplace. It is mainly characterised by bureaucratic secrecy and well-entrenched networks of gatekeepers/custodians of the deep-sited group interests. Also, public institutions employees are not as easily expendable as private sector employees. Instead, they are often somewhat cushioned by a plethora of laws and intricate and hierarchical disciplinary processes. Besides, they are protected by powerful informal networks within and outside public administration and more importantly, public institutions feature typical developing and democratising challenges. These include personalised loyalty, loosely regulated institutional environments, fluid policy-ownership, extreme disorganisation, institutionalisation deficits (limited statehood conditions), dishonesty, haphazardness, amateurism, and autocratic and self-serving leadership traditions. Under such conditions, conflict of interest is elusive, corruption is less punitive, whistleblowers are despised, and whistleblower protection legislation is implemented in a reactionary manner. This essay dissects these issues within the broader whistleblowing and whistleblower protection and functional governance literature giving nuanced illustrations in India, Bangladesh, Brazil, Ghana and South Africa. Conclusions provide an overview of improving whistleblower protection in developing countries, underpinned mainly in the realisation of democratic public administration.