Abstract
This research is a two-stage, cross sectional analysis that finds evidence that nine antitakeover defenses (ATDs) are associated with lower firm value in terms of Tobin’s Q. Of the nine, six are limits on shareholder rights such as staggered boards. The other four have the potential of increasing the cost of a takeover such as pension parachutes that prohibit successor firms from using pension surpluses to finance the takeover. Six ATDs, such as anti-greenmail provisions, are associated with higher firm values.
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