Abstract

The post-Soviet setting is characterized by a disheartening political paradox. Since the fall of communism, some kind of electoralism has been spreading to almost every corner of the former empire, yet liberal rights and the rule of law have not been its fellow travelers; nor do they seem destined to provide companionship in the imminent future. Revisiting the long-standing German current of fiscal sociology, it is possible to solve this paradox. In the Europe of yesterday, liberal constitutionalism was the product of a quid pro quo between the rulers and the ruled: an exchange of rights for revenue. Historically, this “grand bargain of the liberal state” was a prerequisite for liberal democracy, and the very same social mechanisms—or lack thereof— seem to be operating in the post-Soviet world of today.

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