‘Where the state feared to tread’: Britain, Britons, covert action and the Yemen Civil War, 1962–64

Abstract

The Egyptian-inspired revolution that overthrew the Imamate in Yemen in September 1962 presented British policy makers with a series of acute dilemmas. While the defence of Aden was regarded by the Chiefs of Staff as central to the protection of British interests in the Middle East, the means by which this was to be achieved exposed deep cleavages among policy-makers chastened by the experience of Suez. While officials in Whitehall condoned a series of official covert operations along the Federation border with Yemen they remained strictly controlled and defensive in nature. By contrast, a group of influential Conservative MPs, having already engaged in what might be termed para-diplomacy that effectively stymied British recognition of the new regime in Sana'a , looked to extend British clandestine activity to include direct aid to, and training of, the Royalist Forces deep inside Yemen itself. With the initial support of key Middle Eastern potentates, a private mercenary organization emerged that, while enjoying the tacit encouragement of some in Whitehall, acted above and beyond the control of London in support of what they considered to be Britain's interest, an interest which, despite the huge political and diplomatic risks involved, came to enlist the help of Israel. At a time when much academic attention has been focused on the rise of the private military organization, the debates over their efficacy, both political and moral, as a tool of foreign policy can be traced to events in the mountains and deserts of the Yemen over four decades ago.