Where moral enhancement goes wrong

Abstract

Recently, whether or not moral enhancement is permissible has been a hot issue in a new academic field of neuroethics. Several scholars have proposed moral enhancement as a reliable solution to the serious moral evils that humans face. They believe that we should pursue and employ biomedical means to morally enhance human beings. They suggest that there are in principle no philosophical or moral objections to the use of biomedical means of moral enhancement and that the current moral predicament of humankind is so serious that it is imperative that scientific research explore every possibility of developing effective means of moral enhancement, as a complement of traditional means. The purpose of this article was to analyze the errors of such a suggestion in a critical manner. In a viewpoint of ethics, moral enhancement commits three important errors such as compulsion, reductionism, and methodological individualism. In a viewpoint of pedagogy, it is not based on the logic of education but that of simple designing. Furthermore, moral enhancement does deny the right to negotiate children``s moral identities. Therefore, it is not persuasive that moral enhancement for all the people should be done in obligatory or compulsory ways.