Abstract
Two varieties of misinterpretation of the principle of double effect have led moralists to doubt the principle’s validity. There is a polarization, in the literature of the principle itself. Overwhelmingly, moralists who discuss or apply the principle narrow their focus to either the criterion of proportionate reason or the criterion distinguishing between direct and indirect intention. Double effect literature now comprises two discrete traditions of interpretation, each incomplete. The two most cited histories of the principle reflect this polarization. To address the confusion, this article compares these histories, arguing that both must be maintained if the principle of double effect is to be an effective means of moral evaluation.
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