Where Is the Sin in Sincere? Sophisticated Manipulation of Sincere Judicial Voters (With Applications to Other Voting Environments)

Abstract

We present one of the first small-group voting models that allows sophisticated and sincere voters to interact. We investigate sophistication in a particular sequential setting, where an initial decision of one group may be revised subsequently by another voting group. Although the discussion is phrased in terms of judges, courts, and Congress, the model applies to a wider array of situations. We use this framework to investigate the likelihood that courts include sophisticated and sincere judicial voters sitting together. The main conclusion of our investigation is that if sincere voting in the courts were the norm, then we should observe a patter of behavior that is inconsistent with the available evidence: first, subsequent congressional reversals of judicial decisions should be common; second, judicial opinions would tend to be the outcome of liberal/conservative coalitions. Since neither outcome is the prevalent norm of judicial decision-making, we suggest tiat scholars of the judicial system may assume, at least for the time being, that sophisticated behavior among justices is the norm rather than the exception.