Abstract

Enactive cognitive science (ECS) and ecological psychology (EP) agree that active movement is important for perception, but they remain ambiguous regarding the precise role of agency. EP has focused on the notion of sensorimotor invariants, according to which bodily movements play an instrumental role in perception. ECS has focused on the notion of sensorimotor contingencies, which goes beyond an instrumental role because skillfully regulated movements are claimed to play a constitutive role. We refer to these two hypotheses as instrumental agency and constitutive agency, respectively. Evidence comes from a variety of fields, including neural, behavioral, and phenomenological research, but so far with confounds that prevent an experimental distinction between these hypotheses. Here we advance the debate by proposing a novel double-participant setup that aims to isolate agency as the key variable that distinguishes bodily movement in active and passive conditions of perception. We pilot this setup with a psychological study of width discrimination using the Enactive Torch, a haptic sensory substitution device. There was no evidence favoring the stronger hypothesis of constitutive agency over instrumental agency. However, we caution that during debriefing several participants reported using cognitive strategies that did not rely on spatial perception. We conclude that this approach is a viable direction for future research, but that greater care is required to establish and confirm the desired modality of first-person experience.

Highlights

  • The fields of enactive cognitive science (ECS) and ecological psychology (EP) are two prominent alternatives to orthodox cognitive science, and which are in agreement about the need for a relational account of mind situated at the personal level (Chemero, 2009)

  • When EP uses optic flow to derive time-to-contact it does not matter whether perceptual flow is brought about by bodily movements actively performed by the perceiver, or if flow is just passively undergone due to changes in the perceiver’s environment

  • The null result is more in line with the more conservative hypothesis of instrumental agency, rather than with the stronger hypothesis of constitutive agency

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Summary

Introduction

The fields of enactive cognitive science (ECS) and ecological psychology (EP) are two prominent alternatives to orthodox cognitive science, and which are in agreement about the need for a relational account of mind situated at the personal level (Chemero, 2009) They share a commitment to the claim that perception is a dynamic process, and that movement is essential for perception, yet they disagree on a number of points regarding the nature of perception (Varela et al, 2017; Heras-Escribano, 2019). Ecological psychology started as a non-representational account of perception (Gibson, 1979), but has since developed into a more comprehensive non-representational psychology As such, it has a strong interest in agency and active exploration (Heras-Escribano, 2019).

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