Where Is Russia Going? Putin's Second Term

Abstract

The little of our journal--Demokratizatsiya--identifies a key question in contemporary Russia: Is Russia going along a path of democratization or is it treading along a path of authoritarianism? In recent months, a genuine debate has been unfolding in American scholarship over this fundamental question. There is no consensus, however; convincing arguments are being advanced on both sides. Those who praise Putin's accomplishments point to the healthy economy, reduction of national debt, favorable ratings from international economic agencies, and steady economic growth in Russia. In addition, some scholars follow the advancement of judicial reform with keen interest. In the four years of Putin's presidency the country received a new criminal code, criminal procedural code, alterations of the political system and political process, land code, and labor code. Several other code changes are on the way. Introduction of the rule of law requires having laws in the first place, and Putin certainly has introduced those laws. Even the most skeptical observer would have to agree that the adoption of these laws is a tremendous achievement and that few presidents can boast that kind of four-year record. However, the critics assert that despite these achievements, the glass is half empty and leaking, as Michael McFaul has stated, i The main criticisms of Putin are in the area of democratization. It is asserted that Putin has * wrecked the independent press, * incarcerated his political opponents, * emasculated both houses of parliament, and * undermined a useful and necessary counterweight to central power in Russia by weakening the governors. The charges do not end here. Some also levy the more serious charges of rigging elections and weakening political parties and civil society. Because there are so few who are willing to advance counterarguments, and such arguments need to be made to be fair, this introduction to the spring issue of Democratizatsiya attempts to bring them to light. 1. The charge that Putin weakened the press rests primarily on the fact that control of NTV and Nezavisimaya Gazeta was taken from the powerful oligarchs Vladimir Gusinsky and Boris Berezovsky. It is assumed that freedom of the press is best guaranteed when controlled by independent, wealthy magnates. The counter-argument is that media outlets under Gusinsky and Berezovsky were not free-that they were manipulated in favor of specific interest groups and that the independent magnates were criminal mafia bosses who had stolen billions of assets from the Russian state. By depriving those kinds of people of media control, Putin did Russia a favor. The defense of these oligarchs comes from the fallacious assumption that independent businessmen are better that the state. International media organizations assert that the Russian press is free--especially inMoscow and St. Petersburg, which were the most free, and in the autonomous ethnic republics, which were the least free. 2. The incarceration of Mikhail Khodorkovsky can hardly be seen as equal to the persecution of a political opponent. Here again, the former oligarch has amassed a fortune through the unscrupulous manipulation and theft of national resources. The Menatep bank, which he headed was well known for its connection to stolen Communist party funds and the former KGB. The bank was heavily involved in the speculation with government short-term bonds (GKOs), money laundering, and other financial crimes. It is a blessing that the man is in prison and that his empire is crumpling. It is interesting to consider why Putin is not doing the same to other oligarchs. The answer is that it would trigger capital flight out of Russia and even sharper critique from the West. The West is quite comfortable keeping and hiding Berezovsky, the Godfather of the Kremlin under Yeltsin, from Russian law. The financial crimes be was involved with were conducted in England, but British law enforcement is in no hurry to prosecute him. …