Where does implementation lie? Assessing the determinants of delegation and discretion in post-Maastricht European Union

Marta Migliorati

doi:10.1017/s0143814x20000100

Abstract

AbstractDrawing on a principal–agent framework the article analyses the European Union (EU) politics of delegation in the post-Maastricht era. By means of statistical analysis, it tests the impact of several variables upon the selection of national and supranational agents, as well as on the discretion they enjoy, on the basis of a recently collected data set of EU laws. Findings reveal that pooling and policy complexity favour the involvement of supranational actors in the implementation of EU laws. Moreover, the degree of supranational integration of a policy affects the likelihood of choosing supranational implementers. On the one hand, the Commission enjoys higher discretion vis-à-vis national actors when qualified majority voting applies, and when higher levels of conflict in the Council of Ministers is present. On the other, conflict between the European Parliament and the Council under codecision seems associated with lower supranational discretion, although the result needs further corroboration.

Highlights

Who has the power of implementing policies in the European Union (EU)? Answering this question is harder than it may seem at first sight
Considering the increasing politicisation of EU integration (Hartlapp et al 2014; Hooghe and Marks 2009; Rauh 2019), it may be the case that the logics of delegation themselves in the EU are influenced by this pattern: in particular, the unpopularity of certain policy decisions may result in higher levels of discretion to the Commission or to EU agencies
As much as description per se does not provide causal explanation, this step was useful for the purposes of a subsequent investigation of why specific delegation choices occur and how much agent control is associated with them

Summary

Introduction

Who has the power of implementing policies in the European Union (EU)? Answering this question is harder than it may seem at first sight. According to recent work by Conceição-Heldt (2017), preference homogeneity between states and the Parliament in trade policy results in lower discretion to the Commission, as more cohesive principals are more successful in presenting a unified front vis-à-vis their agent Against this background, I draw a general hypothesis on the relationship between conflict and discretion: H5: The higher the preference heterogeneity of principals, the higher the discretion granted to the supranational level. Considering the increasing politicisation of EU integration (Hartlapp et al 2014; Hooghe and Marks 2009; Rauh 2019), it may be the case that the logics of delegation themselves in the EU are influenced by this pattern: in particular, the unpopularity of certain policy decisions may result in higher levels of discretion to the Commission or to EU agencies. Council-EP proximity– integration: absolute value of the difference between the median EP and the Council Pivot-

Other Procedures Model II

Other Procedures

Findings

Discussion