Abstract

One of the enduring puzzles about Japanese foreign policy since the 1970s has been the gap between the nation’s economic power and its military capability. Despite its status as one of the leading market economies in the world, Japan has been very reluctant to translate its economic resources into military power and has acted in large part as what Richard Rosecrance called a “trading state.”1 Although the absolute amount of Japan’s defense budget is quite substantial, its relative size, measured in relation to gross domestic product (GDP), is one of the smallest among the advanced industrial nations.2

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