Abstract

AbstractKant's characterisation of honeste vive as an unenforceable duty of right owed to oneself poses two systematic problems: it conflicts with Kant's claims that (a) duties of right concern the external relation between distinct individuals and (b) duties of right are externally enforceable. Both of these claims speak against the possibility of a duty of right to oneself. This article addresses this interpretative problem. Regarding (a) I suggest that while honeste vive is a duty owed to oneself, the content of the duty concerns one's interaction with others. Regarding (b) I maintain that honeste vive is a general duty of right, and such duties are not externally enforceable. This view both allows for an understanding of the structure of obligation in the Doctrine of Right as a whole and forces us to reconsider two central aspects of Kant's concept of right—namely, that all rights are externally enforceable and owed to others. Not only does honeste vive belong to the Doctrine of Right but understanding the way in which it does can illuminate the significance and scope of duties belonging to Kant's political philosophy.

Highlights

  • Kant tells us in the Introduction to his Doctrine of Right that all duties of right both (a) concern the external relation that distinct individuals stand in to each other and (b) are rightfully enforceable by others, the state.1 These features, in part, help to distinguish duties belonging to the juridical realm from those that belong to ethics

  • Does honeste vive belong to the Doctrine of Right but understanding the way in which it does can illuminate the significance and scope of duties belonging to Kant's political philosophy

  • It indicates that the duties belonging to that philosophy are broader than is often assumed. This allows for the duties such as those that we find in the cases equity and civil disobedience to be incorporated into Kant's political philosophy

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Summary

Introduction

Kant tells us in the Introduction to his Doctrine of Right that all duties of right both (a) concern the external (i.e. physical) relation that distinct individuals stand in to each other and (b) are rightfully enforceable by others, the state. These features, in part, help to distinguish duties belonging to the juridical realm from those that belong to ethics (the latter of which Kant discusses primarily in the Groundwork, second Critique, and Doctrine ofEur J Philos. 2020;1–16.wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/ejop DAVIESVirtue). Kant tells us in the Introduction to his Doctrine of Right that all duties of right both (a) concern the external (i.e. physical) relation that distinct individuals stand in to each other and (b) are rightfully enforceable by others, the state.. Rightful honor (honestas iuridica) consists in asserting one's worth as a human being in relation to others, a duty expressed by the saying, ‘Do not make yourself a mere means for others but be at the same time an end for them’. This duty will be explained later as obligation from the right of humanity in our own person (MM 6:236)

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