When votes depend on who's listening: Voters' intragroup status and voting procedure predict representative endorsement in intergroup contexts.

Abstract

Three experiments investigated whether the selection of a representative in intergroup interdependence settings can reflect group members' strategic behaviour. We tested the impact of an individual's intragroup status (normative vs. pro-out-group deviant, Experiments 1-3) and of voting procedure (Experiments 2 and 3) on the choice of an in-group representative. Experiment 1 shows that normative members prefer normative representatives, whereas pro-out-group deviant members equally like normative and pro-out-group deviant representatives. Experiment 2 extends these results and shows that voting procedure (private vs. in-group audience) moderates this effect. Pro-out-group deviant members' preferences and behaviours appear more strategic and context-sensitive than normative ones. Specifically, pro-out-group deviants vote more for normative representatives than for pro-out-group deviants when facing an in-group audience, whereas the reverse pattern emerges in private. Experiment 3 shows that this moderation effect is specific to in-group audiences compared to out-group ones, reinforcing the idea that normative members 'stick to their guns'. Implications of these findings for leader endorsement and intergroup relations are discussed.