Abstract
This essay analyzes the prosecution models espoused in Brazil and in the US when the accused party is the president. Both the head of the Brazil’s Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office and the American prosecutor, ad hoc, were given a high degree of autonomy, which was reduced after scandals. Between the “autonomy to fight corruption” or “stability in the political system”, the latter prevailed after experiments with autonomous prosecutors.
Highlights
This essay analyzes the prosecution models espoused in Brazil and in the us when the accused party is the president
The second section will discuss changes in Brazil regarding the way appointments are made for the head of the Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office, who is the sole player with the power to make judicial accusations against the president, the ministers and congressmen/women, and how the different governments after the 1988 Constitution have handled the trade-off between autonomy and protection for the president
In the final considerations, I will align the debate between the different institutional frameworks that allow prosecutors not within the ranks of the us Department of Justice and the two models for appointing the head of the Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office that were used in the democratic period in Brazil
Summary
This essay analyzes the prosecution models espoused in Brazil and in the us when the accused party is the president. The second section will discuss changes in Brazil regarding the way appointments are made for the head of the Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office, who is the sole player with the power to make judicial accusations against the president, the ministers and congressmen/women, and how the different governments after the 1988 Constitution have handled the trade-off between autonomy and protection for the president.
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