When the International Security Debate Triggers a Provoking Question: Is Suspending and Expelling Members of NATO Feasible Despite the Silent Constituent Treaty?

Abstract

The paper takes the opportunity of the current relationships between Turkey with the NATO and NATO Members in order to analyze, to what extent the “law of international treaties” may provide some answer to the question of the suspension and expulsion of members of an international organization when the relevant constituent treaty is silent on the point. The reference is to the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and its provisions on the “suspension” and the “selective” termination of multilateral treaties. The legal question is by far more puzzling that the state of relations with Turkey and deserve an analysis also because of general interest and not necessarily linked to the said Member State. Accordingly, the issue of silent constituent is considered along with suggestions made by scholarship about the applicability of “implicit” or “inherent powers” to overcome “disruptive practices” by member States. Subsequently the issue of relevant rules of the organization are examined as such rules may prevent the application of the VCLT in order to fill regulatory gaps. Finally, the paper examines the provisions of the VCLT in its operative part, altogether with the relevant safeguards established for dispute settlement mechanisms. The conclusion is that, while the analysis of the international scenario is better left to political analysts, the integration of the constituent treaty with the VCLT is feasible with some caveats.