Abstract

Thus, the balance of the argument appears to lie definitely on the side of EMU accession when we look at it from the perspective of the NMS interests. However, from the perspective of incumbent EMU members’ interests, although we can state that many of the arguments put forward against early EMU accession have been overblown, we cannot avoid the conclusion that the arguments are more finely balanced. This is especially the case when we analyze the situation of slow growing incumbents, who are also likely to be members of any ‘core’ grouping, and that of a Commission that is eager to expand its powers into fiscal policy and fiscal policy coordination. Given the opposing interests between the two sides, and the fact that it is impossible to forbid EU members from joining EMU if they fulfill the Maastricht criteria, we can expect to see an intensified effort by the Commission and certain incumbent Member States to dissuade NMS from joining EMU. There may even be an attempt to return to the idea of tightening the accession criteria, although this would be hard to square with the principle of ‘equality between present and future Member States’17.

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