Abstract

When a major corruption scandal emerged during the organisation of the 2015 Universal Exposition in Milan, the government set up a brand-new system of preliminary controls for the procurement of all Expo contracts. Controls can certainly be beneficial in many respects, but they inevitably complicate procedures and even produce delays and red tape. Indeed, for a time-pressed schedule as that of the 2015 Expo, preliminary controls were considered a fatal blow. Contrary to expectations, not only bureaucratic delays did not materialise, but controls actually sped up procedures. Therefore, it is worth explaining and learning from this unique outcome. Can it be replicated in other cases? We answer this question by building a model of controls based on programme and non-programme features that support three causal mechanisms: threat attribution, repeated interactions, and actor certification. Such a model is an indispensable tool for designers; it allows to explain how controls work in practice and provide clues on how to adjust the design of the policy to changing contexts. In this respect, the analysis of the Expo controls and their subsequent replications raises several methodological issues relevant to extrapolation-oriented research.

Highlights

  • Hosting mega-events, such as world fairs, football championships, or the Olympics, is highly prized by policymakers

  • When a major corruption scandal emerged during the organisation of the 2015 Universal Exposition in Milan, the government set up a brand-new system of preliminary controls for the procurement of all Expo contracts

  • Controls can certainly be beneficial in many respects, but they inevitably complicate procedures and even produce delays and red tape

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Summary

Introduction

Hosting mega-events, such as world fairs, football championships, or the Olympics, is highly prized by policymakers. Mega-events are promoted as opportunities for triggering radical changes in the political, economic, and urban agendas (Stevens & Bevan, 1999; Kang & Perdue, 1994; Spilling, 1996; Bramwell, 1997). Hallmark events are characterised by time pressure, fast-track decision making, the suspension of ordinary administrative procedures, and an overall lack of transparency (Pillay et al, 2010). In combination with exceptional public spending, rushing administrations, and special procedures, opportunities for corruption are a typical concern for such events. Together with five other people, the procurement director of the Lombardy Region and the procurement manager of Expo Ltd.—the contracting authority and organising company of the Expo—were arrested. There were allegations of an organised criminal group able to manipulate all the Expo 2015 bids (Biondani & Gatti, 2014)

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