When Reason Fails Us: How We Act and What We Do When We Do Not Know What to Do

Abstract

An important feature of so-called rational decision making, at least in times of crisis, is arational: that is, our ability to decide manifests features of our characters or the values we hold rather than our reasoning abilities.1 Such a position stands in obvious opposition to the Western philosophical tradition. Consider, by comparison, the view of Immanuel Kant, who held that reason could, and perhaps sometimes ought to, operate independently of (and in opposition to) our sentiments. Contrary to Kant, William James argues in “The Sentiment of Rationality” that arational mental states and phenomena—such as feelings, emotions, values, and attitudes—are indispensable to practical rationality (317). The attempt to characterize decision making, particularly in times of ethical crises, as rational is a long-standing practice in philosophy that has begun to receive challenges both from inside and outside of philosophy. Experimental ethicists have shown a willingness to break from a strictly rationalist conception of ethics, and social psychologists have argued that there is very little evidence to support the contention, common amongst philosophers, that people form judgments, especially ethical judgments, solely on the basis of rational justifications.2 It may well be that the best guide for understanding the operation of practical reason when considering different ethical frameworks is to be found in the discipline of philosophy of science. This article argues that this approach is, in fact, the best guide and, therefore, starts with a discussion of Bas van Fraassen’s stance on scientific revolutions. In The Empirical Stance, Bas van Fraassen gives an answer to the following question: “How are we to understand scientific and conceptual revolutions?” (100). The answer he provides, interestingly, is perspective-dependent. And, more interestingly, it also helps to answer a seemingly very different question: