Abstract

Intuition can lead to more effective decision-making than analysis under certain conditions. This assumption can be regarded as common sense. However, dominant research streams on intuition effectiveness in decision-making conceptualize intuition inadequately, because intuition is considered either detrimental or as a form of analysis. Current findings in general intuition research show that intuition is a holistic form of information processing that is distinct from analysis and can be superior in some cases. To reconcile this mismatch, this article first critically assesses dominant conceptions on intuition effectiveness and then offers a re-conceptualization that builds on current findings of general intuition research. Basically, the article suggests the structuredness of the decision problem as the main criterion for intuition effectiveness, and proposes organization information processing theory to establish this link conceptually. It is not the uncertainty but the equivocality of decision problems that call for an intuitive approach. The article conclusively derives implications for further research and discusses potential restrictions and constraints.

Highlights

  • In managerial decision research, there is a steadily growing interest in the role intuition plays in decision-making (Sadler-Smith 2016)

  • The aim of the article was to provide a starting point for future research on intuition effectiveness. It suggests that future research should be based on three general assumptions

  • To properly assess intuition effectiveness, dominant assumptions about the nature of intuition have to be revised in favour of a parallelcompetitive view of human information processing

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Summary

Introduction

There is a steadily growing interest in the role intuition plays in decision-making (Sadler-Smith 2016). This definition differentiates intuitive from analytical decisions as slow, conscious and sequential deliberations It is consistent with the growing consensus that intuitive and analytic approaches refer to two distinct types of information processing systems (Dane et al 2011; Dane and Pratt 2007; Epstein 1994; Evans 2010; Hodgkinson and Clarke 2007), implying that intuition cannot be reduced to a shortcut to deliberation (Betsch and Glockner 2010). Intuition is regarded as ecologically rational if it matches the structure of the environment more adequately than an analytical approach In this case, intuition effectiveness is assumed to be higher than analysis effectiveness, and analytically approaching the decision problem is assumed to be irrational. We follow the argument ‘‘that researchers should concentrate on investigating the processes underlying intuition first before making strong claims about its performance’’ (Glockner and Witteman 2010: 13)

Herbert Simon’s view on intuition
The heuristics and biases program
The fast and frugal heuristics program
Implicit and explicit information processing
The structuredness of the decision problem
Introducing organization information processing theory
Implications for future research
Restrictions and constraints
Conclusion
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