Abstract

PurposeThis paper investigates the influence of political connections on sustainability disclosure in the context of China's Regulation 18.Design/methodology/approachThe study employs a quasi-experimental approach, utilizing difference-in-difference (DiD) analysis, dynamic DiD and propensity score matching to analyze the effects of politically connected independent directors on sustainability disclosure following the implementation of Regulation 18.FindingsCompanies with politically connected independent directors show an improvement in sustainability disclosures after Regulation 18. This effect is stronger for firms facing high political pressure or lacking alternative political power. Additionally, the increase in value from sustainability disclosures compensates for the loss of politically connected independent directors, indicating a positive value impact of sustainability disclosures.Originality/valueThis study provides novel insights into the corporate disclosure policy in China by investigating the impact of politically connected directors on sustainability disclosure. Additionally, it sheds light on the limitations of political power and its substitution effects within companies.

Full Text
Published version (Free)

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call