When payments for environmental services will work for conservation

Sven Wunder

doi:10.1111/conl.12034

Abstract

AbstractUsing the article by Muradian et al. () as entry point, I develop a broader framework for the conditions needed to allow PES to emerge and function. It is argued that PES are designed as instruments with clear goals, and will function without markets, economic valuation, or commoditized services. As a highly adaptive management tool, PES are particularly suited for achieving equitable and flexible conservation outcomes. However, PES do require a payment culture and good organization from service users, a trustful negotiation climate, and well‐defined land‐ or resource‐tenure regimes for providers. These demanding preconditions may explain why PES implementation, while promising in many cases, has only spread slowly in low‐income countries.

Highlights

Muradian et al (2013) discuss the suitability of payments for ecosystem services (PES), and warn about “overreliance on payments” as a conservation tool
Over the last half-decade, especially Roldan Muradian and his coauthors have inter alia in two special sections criticized the mainstream approach to PES (Farley & Costanza 2010; Muradian et al 2010); others make in another PES special section (Brockington et al 2011) various related points
Ferraro 2001; Wunder 2005; Pagiola & Platais 2007), with case analyses published in another special issue (Engel et al 2008; Wunder et al 2008)

Summary

Introduction

Muradian et al (2013) discuss the suitability of payments for ecosystem services (PES), and warn about “overreliance on payments” as a conservation tool. I will scrutinize what necessary conditions are needed for PES to emerge and function, focusing on three areas: (1) the perceived economic benefit and costs (Section 4), (2) cultural features in paying and receiving incentives (Section 5), and (3) institutional requirements (Section 6).

Results

Conclusion