When Missions Fail: Lessons in ‘High Technology’ From Post-War Britain

Abstract

The idea that national security and economic prosperity stem from being at the technological frontier (‘techno-nationalism’) is once again a dominant feature of global politics. The post-war United States has emerged as the key model in these discussions, with the ‘moonshot’ seen as an outstanding example of how to direct state resources towards technological breakthroughs, while the capacity of the American government is praised more generally for its ability to sponsor ground-breaking technology. This paper, however, suggests that the United States was the exception, not the rule, and that the failures of post-war Britain highlight the limitations of ‘techno-nationalism’ with vivid clarity. During the 1950s and 1960s, the British state took long-term bets on securing a leading role in the world’s technological future, specifically in the areas of supersonic flight via Concorde and nuclear power generation. The result, however, was not export glory but industrial calamity. These long-running programmes were eventually cut back in the 1970s, when it became accepted in Whitehall that Britain should no longer try to be the Science and Tech Superpower, attempting to leapfrog the United States to technological glory. Understanding this trajectory in Britain dislodges the sense that focusing on emerging technology and the long term is a silver bullet in policymaking. We must appreciate that the realities of technological power matter, and grasp that the post-war US was an unrepresentative case: no country today will have the relative level of industrial and technological might that it enjoyed at that time. While my arguments will resonate in other national contexts, my focus is on ensuring that any strategy for ‘high technology’ in the UK today continues to learn the lessons from the errors of the post-war period. It must be wary of expert capture within the state. It must also think about industrial strategy in an integrated way, across national security, economics, and foreign policy, with a policymaking machinery set up to deal with this level of complexity. Moreover, despite the attention afforded to national state funding, the UK should continue to see forging alliances as essential alongside working with international business and be clear-eyed about where it does and does not need to sustain national capabilities.