When justice answers to the president: reexamining the effect of cabinet partisanship on human rights in presidential democracies

Abstract

Recent research suggests that the administrations of presidents with diverse cabinets are less likely (and less able) to violate human rights. I posit that a more clear image of how (and where) repression occurs can be obtained by looking at the cabinet portfolios that have the greatest capacity to repress, such as the ministry of justice (which typically oversees a state’s justice system and prison apparatus). In this research note, I reexamine the relationship between cabinet partisanship and government respect for human rights by empirically testing the effect that presidential control over the ministry of justice has on human rights violations in presidential democracies. I find that states are more likely to experience greater government respect for human rights when the justice minister is in a different party than the president’s party. I conclude by suggesting that given the expansive power justice ministers have with regards to the administration of justice, perhaps this position is best occupied by an individual whose first loyalties are the law and the rights of citizens, rather than political party and presidential piety.