Abstract
BackgroundThe reliability of signals is a key issue in the study of animal communication. Both empirical work and theoretical models show that communication need not be entirely honest, and thus signals can be deceitful. Aggressive communication appears to be a prime candidate for such deceitful communication, because bluffing has been described in several species. Bluffing in these situations are supposed to be maintained by frequency dependent selection where the fitness of a given type depends on the frequencies of the other types in the population. Previous efforts to model such a scenario through individual based simulations have yielded conflicting results. Studies have either found a rich set of polymorphic strategies including the traditional cheating scenario or found none. Thus, the modelling assumptions responsible for these diverging conclusions remain unclear.ResultsIn this study, I investigate the effects of four modelling assumptions: the role of an extended strategy set, the initial population composition (seeding), the differences in pay-offs and finally different parameter spaces. I investigate the effects of these factors on the evolvability of both honest and mixed cheating strategies. I show that both honest and cheating equilibria readily evolve and that the investigated parameter range and the seeding of the starting populations have the greatest influence on the outcome.ConclusionsBoth honest signalling and polymorphic cheating equilibria are more likely to evolve from a narrow strategy set than from a random mixture of strategies. A large potential strategy set is not a setback for the evolution of communication -honest or cheating- as long as the initial population is seeded with only a few strategies. In addition, different sections of the parameter space show consistently different behaviour. Thus, frequency dependent selection has the potential to explain various empirical observations that show consistent differences in aggressive behaviour.
Highlights
The reliability of signals is a key issue in the study of animal communication
Initial population composition Seeding the populations with only 8 strategies (8S) instead of 36 (36S) favours the evolution of honest or dishonest polymorphic equilibria depending on the parameter regions (Fig. 5)
Previous models have shown that mixed cheating can be explained by frequency dependent selection, that these equilibria can be evolutionarily stable [24] and that these equilibria can evolve under appropriate conditions [25]
Summary
The reliability of signals is a key issue in the study of animal communication. Both empirical work and theoretical models show that communication need not be entirely honest, and signals can be deceitful. Enquist asked whether cost free signals emitted at the communication stage can reliably transmit information about this unobservable quality To answer this question, he investigated two global strategies (see detailed definitions below): to be honest and to lie (cheat). Enquist has shown that as long as potential cheaters are unable to flee from the attack of honest strong individuals, there is a fighting cost threshold that prevents the spread of cheating in an honest population. Both the model and the results were ground-breaking at that time, because Enquist was the first to show that variation in behaviour can be a reliable signal and that the receiver’s response can maintain the signal’s honesty
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