When Figurative Analogies Fail: Fallacious Uses of Arguments from Analogy

Abstract

In this contribution, arguments from figurative analogy are reconstructed with the help of a slightly revised version of the descriptive and normative argument schemes and the list of critical questions established by Walton et al. (Argumentation schemes. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2008). However, insights taken from the New Rhetoric of Perelman/Olbrechts-Tyteca (Traité de l’argumentation. Editions de l’université de Bruxelles, Bruxelles, 1983), from recent Pragma-Dialectical contributions by Garssen (Comparing the incomparable: figurative analogies in a dialectical testing procedure. In FH van Eemeren, B Garssen (eds), Pondering on problems of argumentation. SicSat, Amsterdam, pp 133–140, 2009) and from Woods’ (The death of argument. Kluwer, Dordrecht, 2004) formal analysis of figurative analogies have also been taken into account. Then the problem of evaluating arguments from figurative analogy is dealt with. A list of four critical questions is formulated. The most important critical question is the following one (= CQ3 = critical question three): “Are the important (that is, the most relevant) differences (dissimilarities) between C1 and C2 too overwhelming to allow a conclusion which crosses the different domains of reality to which C1 and C2 belong?” In addition, five pragmatic parameters for the evaluation of arguments from figurative analogy are formulated, which are useful for clarifying the argumentative value of these arguments (e.g. their use as the only, independent argument or as additional, supportive argument; their status as pro or contra arguments; their seriousness etc.). Furthermore, eight empirical case studies (dealing with text passages from a corpus of about 100 authentic examples, mostly taken from political discourse in Austrian newspapers and parliamentary debates, occasionally also from reports, interviews and advertising texts in Austrian media) are analysed. They show that many instances of the argument from figurative analogy are fallacious or at least highly problematic types of argument. Nevertheless, there are also (more or less) plausible uses of this type of argument. Therefore, a general negative evaluation of arguments from figurative analogy as fallacies is out of place. Often, they can be classified as weak, defeasible arguments, which can, however, legitimately shift the burden of proof. A generally negative attitude towards arguments from figurative analogy cannot explain the substantial differences as to their degree of plausibility which manifests itself if authentic examples from everyday argumentation are taken into consideration. The eight case studies also show that arguments from figurative analogy can be seen as specific cases of “strategic maneuvering” (cf. van Eemeren FH, Argumentation 22(3):305–315, 2008; Strategic maneuvering in argumentative discourse. Benjamins, Amsterdam, 2010; van Eemeren FH and Houtlosser P, Strategic maneuvering with the burden of proof. In van Eemeren FH (ed) Advances in pragma-dialectics. SicSat, Amsterdam, pp 13–28, 2002; van Eemeren FH and Grootendorst R, A systematic theory of argumentation. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004), which can be a legitimate means of argumentation in some cases, but can also “derail” in other situations.KeywordsFigurative AnalogyCritical QuestionArgument SchemeMajor PremiseStrategic ManeuveringThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.