Abstract
This paper examines the potential welfare effects of storage under different market structures. This includes combinations of perfectly competitive and strategic generation and storage sectors, and standalone and generator-owned storage. We demonstrate that if the generation sector is perfectly competitive and does not own storage, then storage cannot be welfare-diminishing. Otherwise, generator-owned storage or standalone storage in a market with strategic generating firms can reduce welfare compared to the no-storage case. This contradicts conventional wisdom that adding firms to an imperfectly competitive market typically reduces welfare losses.
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